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Caribbean countries are re-evaluating their options for global economic interaction so as to reconcile regional policies 
with global trends. Historically, emphasis was placed on Europe, deriving from the colonial relationship, but since the second 
World War influence has inexorably shifted to North America. Recently overshadowing this shift was the rapid development 
of the global economy, to which countries were reacting by either seeking the broadest multilateral relationships, in accordance 
with the principles o f the GATT/WTO, or by coalescing into more narrowly defined regional economic blocs. The first option, 
encouraged by new technologies, held the possibility for smaller constituencies and economic clusters to interact independently 
across national boundaries, creating a finely patterned mosaic of diverse actors and interests associating for mutual benefit. The 
second option held the potential either to quicken the pace of change toward the first global option, or, conversely, to increase 
economic competition between a few polarized regional blocs, which sought to incorporate larger clusters o f  nation-States 
operating in tandem under the control of a dominant partner. Smaller countries might be greatly favoured under the first option 
but ran the risk o f being smothered under the second.
Attitudes to these choices were shaped by the Caribbean integration movement, which has dominated Caribbean 
intellectual thinking and consequently the policy calculus, since independence. CARICOM evolved from the West Indian 
Federation and continued to be strongly influenced by developments within the European Union. However, it was also deeply 
rooted in Caribbean nationalism. This prompted the adoption of policies to insulate regional economies from the vagaries of  
global developments, but they have failed to do so. Instead they have reduced the capacity o f member countries to adapt to and 
benefit from the most dynamic global developments.
Dissatisfaction with the pace o f domestic development and the aforementioned global developments have prompted 
a review of the West Indian development paradigm, which has integration at its core. The recommendation o f  the West Indian 
Commission was for a twin track policy, to deepen the CARICOM single market and economy and to widen its economic 
relations, notably to countries bordering the Caribbean Sea, through the ACS. Yet as the implications o f  deepening were 
explored several policies o f the Common Market had to be abandoned as being inconsistent with programmes at the national 
level. Moreover, the creation of NAFTA and the mooted FTAA seem to have garnered a consensus that CARICOM countries 
should strive toward a wider hemispheric relationship.
Current developments, therefore, prompt questions as to: the changes which CARICOM will need to make to its 
current economic arrangements; whether CARICOM countries can qualify as a group for entry to the FTAA and if  not, what 
are the implications o f individual entry for CARICOM; the state o f relations with the EU, including the current preferential 
arrangements; the role o f the ACS given the current impetus to the FTAA; whether the FTAA is a means, and if  so whether 
it is the most appropriate means, to integrate into the global economy; and last but by no means least, whether the FTAA will 
materialize and if not, what alternative exists for Caribbean countries.
Despite the seeming complexity o f choice, all options, to a greater or lesser extent, point in the same direction, 
towards increased global interaction. The CARICOM model must itself now adapt to these developments, since it has in the 
past biased overall economic policy in favour of common market activities, which constitute only a small fraction o f the total 
economies of members and this is unlikely to expand substantially. Policy should, therefore, focus on sustaining macroeconomic 
equilibrium and selecting policy tools which will facilitate smooth transition into global markets for goods, services and capital, 
for this is the option most likely in the long run to maximize the welfare o f CARICOM people. This choice will have 
repercussions for CARICOM economic policy, however, since the goal o f a single sheltered market and economy, as currently 
conceived, are not consistent with it.
Yet, CARICOM is essentially about two goals. The first is to strengthen the bonds which have historically existed 
among its peoples. The second is to fulfil their hopes and aspirations for full employment and improved standards o f work and 
living. Ample scope remains for CARICOM to continue its programmes o f functional cooperation and policy coordination. 
While these activities are directed mainly to its first goal, they also provide a vital input to the second. Tln \ will become crucial 
as globalism builds its momentum and people seek their cultural moorings, for it is only if  Caribbean people can define their 
uniqueness and bring it to bear on the process o f global integration that they will be able to secure their best interests and save 
themselves from being smothered. In order to secure the second goal, however, CARICOM will need to better reconcile its 
common market policies with global trends so as to prepare its members for effective global partnership.
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INTRODUCTION
The English-speaking Caribbean is re-evaluating its options, so as to reconcile regional 
policies with global trends and adapt its economic relations to the requirements o f the twenty-first 
century. It must make substantial progress by the end o f this decade. After 400 years o f close 
economic and political ties with Europe, World War II signaled a major shift, in economic and 
security matters and subsequently in norms and cultural values, away from Europe and into the sphere 
o f interest o f North America. Yet even as policy makers accustomed themselves to this shift, the 
vague outlines of an emerging global economy were discernible, to come sharply into focus over the 
last decade. The options available to Caribbean countries have never been as wide and yet, 
simultaneously, the stakes resting on a correct decision have never been as high.
Several developments accelerated the transition away from Europe, notably: geographic 
proximity and the perception by the United States that it had a major security interest in the 
Caribbean; the Severing o f direct constitutional ties with Britain on the attainment o f independence; 
development o f strategic mineral resources, mainly bauxite and petroleum, by United States: and 
Canadian firms, for use in the United States and Canada, respectively; the growth o f tourism services, 
sold mainly to North America; close communications and media links with the United States; a 
change in the direction of migration and return remittances away from the United Kingdom to North 
America; the strengthening o f trading arrangements between the United States and the Caribbean, 
via the CBI1; the joint agreement between the CARICOM countries and Canada via CARIBCAN; 
the formation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), which incorporated Mexico, setting 
the precedent o f a comprehensive free trade arrangement with a developing country in the 
hemisphere; and latterly, proposals for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) to encompass 
most countries in the hemisphere in a comprehensive relationship, which goes beyond the free 
movement of goods and services, by the year 2005. iu;
Not surprisingly, a shift o f such fundamental importance was not a smooth process, nor was 
the path clearly signposted. Other developments seemed to reinforce traditional relations, such as: 
the British Commonwealth, the effective rearguard action o f the gradually withering British Empire; 
the West Indian Federation, an attempt by the British to permanently link their Caribbean colonies 
together, thus sowing the seeds for subsequent Caribbean integration attempts; successive Lomé 
conventions, codifying preferential arrangements to former Caribbean colonies on the accession of 
Britain to the European trading bloc; and finally, the evolution o f European integration itself, with 
the strong example it set for CARICOM.
Clear understanding o f developments was further complicated by a third factor, which was 
the initially imperceptible coalescence of the global economy. This was driven by advances in 
information technology, a convergence of national patterns of demand, more intense competition and 
the easing o f restrictions on trade and investments (ECLAC 1993, 1994). While its contours were 
at first only vaguely discernible, the pace o f its subsequent growth was such as to catch many by
i
Currently, North America absorbs 50 per cent of CARICOM exports and Europe just under 25 per cent.
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surprise. Understanding the process of globalization and strategically positioning oneself to take 
advantage o f its enormous potentials conferred a significant advantage. The key beneficiaries from 
this process were firms which focused on global goals and not simply on their earnings in each 
country, while those firms, sectors or countries which were slow to adapt to the changed 
circumstances suffered relatively smaller economic gains, or were driven out o f  the market.
Heightened competition set in train several defensive mechanisms. One was increased 
protectionism. Another, a potential variant o f the first, was the polarization into regional blocs. 
Greater economies of scale and scope within the confines of a nation-State like entity, so as to 
become more competitive, provided one of the rationale for regional blocs. Accordingly, two contrary 
tendencies were evolving in tandem, globalization and the polarization into regional blocs. 
Globalization was modifying the all pervasive power of the large nation-State. Smaller constituencies 
and economic clusters were being encouraged by new technologies to interact independently across 
national boundaries, creating a finely patterned mosaic o f diverse actors and interests associating for 
mutual benefit. The polarization into regional blocs was moving in a contrary direction, seeking to 
incorporate larger clusters o f nation-States, operating in tandem under the control o f a dominant 
partner. Uniform behaviour was sought via rigid frameworks of rules and regulations as blocs girded 
themselves for possible global competition to be played out between a few large actors. Small 
Caribbean communities seemed not to recognize the implications o f these developments, for while 
the first trend seemed to nurture smaller communities of interest, the latter held the potential to 
smother them.
While the shift in influence from Europe to North America seemed inexorable to some in the 
Caribbean, contrary developments, the traditions and habits of emulation and existing institutional 
linkages all served as tiesto bind others to the associations and habits o f the past. These sentiments, 
in turn, spawned new mutants and institutions to house and safeguard traditional values. West Indian 
integration, the most notable o f these, has somehow managed to produce a seamless blend between 
the distinctly contradictory values inherent in British colonialism and West Indian nationalism and 
produced an amalgam which has managed to secure a powerful hold on regional values over the 
second half o f this century.
Several elements contributed to the West Indian world view, although a backdrop for all of 
them was provided by the painful awareness of a long period of external exploitation via colonialism. 
Elements in the foreground included a shared heritage, traditions and cultural practices. Another, 
made especially valuable because o f the recent attainment of independence, was a strong desire for 
autonomy, to be realized in the capacity to shape one’s own destiny and frame one’s own policies. 
As the predominant importance of the North American economy became felt in the region, both from 
the objective facts outlined above and from its increasing policy influence, reaction to frustrated 
autonomy took the form of a bias among some elites against external developments. The third 
element was a deep sense of vulnerability and insecurity, deriving from what was perceived to be the 
inherent disadvantages inflicted upon them by their small size. These elements, taken together, 
strengthened the sentiments for “sticking by one’s own” and for the application o f policies to insulate
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the group against a hostile external environment. As self-reliance was espoused, self-sufficiency was 
the (vain) hope, all wrapped into the concept of West Indian regionalism and independence.
Regional integration has provided a permanent backdrop against which development policy 
was conducted in the English-speaking Caribbean, ever since it achieved self-government. So 
embedded in the regional consciousness is the concept, that any conception o f development which 
downplays it is considered to be inappropriate to Caribbean needs, or worse, to be disloyal to 
Caribbean values. It has become an article o f faith. This was illustrated in the Chairman’s preface to 
the Report of the West Indian Commission, which stated, “..CARICOM is not something apart; it is 
all o f us; ‘is we’!” (“Time for Action”, The Report o f the West Indian Commission; P. xxi).
Yet despite this universal acceptance, or perhaps because of it, “integration” meant different 
things to different people. For some it was a mechanism to reinforce a strong sense of kinship and 
cultural affinity. For others it satisfied a more pragmatic need, that o f creating a larger single market 
space where economies of scale were better able to flourish in conjunction with a larger and more 
diverse pool of resources, for the more efficient production o f goods and services. For still others it 
was an all encompassing set of activities, a unitary state where the aforementioned, socio-cultural and 
economic factors, were joined together with a political apparatus that reduced the disadvantages of 
very small size, particularly the dangers o f weak national security, a perceived nascent political 
instability and narrow parochialism which mitigated against the impersonal rule o f law.
Supporters o f integration favoured it for one or all o f the above reasons. Yet integration ran 
the risk o f being all things to all people, having a broad measure o f general support, yet with weak 
commitment to concrete actions as the broad consensus unravelled on the narrower interests 
demarcated by specifics. For example, some saw it as a stepping stone to provide a progressively 
larger window on the world; while for others, it was the necessary minimum concession to a wider 
community that would sustain the more familiar in-group. For most, it provided a haven of 
protection, but while for some this was a means, for others it was the goal.
Given its well-springs, the West Indian world view experienced difficulty in adapting itself to 
an integrating global economy and defining a meaningful path for Caribbean countries as they 
prepared themselves for the twenty-first century. On the contrary, since independence it has 
superimposed an essentially inward-looking philosophy on a region which has been, by virtue of 
necessity and then by tradition, outward-looking and open. Despite a great deal o f intellectual and 
physical effort and changed perceptions, the reality o f this outwardness was not significantly reversed 
by integration. Instead, the most carefully laid policies for economic integration have foundered. 
More significant, however, was the policy confusion created at a turning point in Caribbean history 
when the old instincts might have served to anticipate and lead the region quickly toward the 
emerging opportunities in the global market.
The Caribbean development model is at a turning point. It must strengthen its arrangements 
to satisfy those deeply felt psychic needs for unity and mutual sustenance which exist in the region. 
It must strengthen its cultural attributes and preserve its ethnic, racial and linguistic identity. It must
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develop the unique qualities and strengths o f the region and build sufficient self confidence so that 
Caribbean people can face the future and the wider global community with optimism. Finally, it must 
refashion its economic relations and reconcile regional policies with global trends.
Recognizing their small size and limited power, Caribbean countries must rely on their wisdom 
to choose, from the several global tendencies, a set o f relationships which will minimize their 
marginality and allow them to maximize their potentials. “The only way small countries can survive 
the future is., (in)., a world o f polylogue, where many diverse identities can be expressed, where 
racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities are mutually secured. In such a world it would 
not matter whether one lived in a small nation or a large nation, for we would have to create a 
different discourse o f power - one from which dominance has been removed as the arbiter o f what 
is possible and permissible” (Sardar, P 888). The future relations o f Caribbean countries need not be 
based on a sense o f inferiority and the need for preferences. They need not be based on beggar-thy- 
neighbour policies or on the instinct that trade is a zero-sum game. It is not inevitable that these 
countries will be constricted into one or other economic bloc. Rather, future economic relations 
could be fashioned on a set o f universalistic criteria open to the risks and opportunities o f the wider 
global community and benefiting from greater transparency and more clearly defined rules o f the 
game. For this is the framework most likely to preserve the interests o f small actors.
The remainder o f this paper is divided into four sections: a restatement o f the goals and 
objectives o f CARICOM; an outline o f the evolution of the integration movement from Chaguaramas 
to Grand Anse; a recording and analysis o f developments since Grand Anse to the present; and a 
discussion of the options facing CARICOM countries for managing their future economic relations.
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GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Integration has a long and respectable history among the CARICOM countries2. In the past, 
it evolved concurrently and in uneasy symbiosis with, national independence. Indeed, the West Indies 
Federation predated independence, existing from 1958-1962, but met its demise when some of its 
members chose national independence over it. By 1965 three countries decided to make another 
attempt at cooperation, with the signing of the Dickenson Bay agreement and by 1966 The West 
Indies Associated States was formed. In 1968 the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) had 
evolved from it and in the same year, 12 English-speaking countries signed an agreement to create 
the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA). Further momentum was given to the Integration 
movement in 1973, with the signing of the Treaty o f Chaguaramas, which had the objective of 
creating the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)3. Despite this heady pace of 
events and the impossible timetable for implementation, these efforts were considered by some to 
reflect a deficit in ambition and strategic timidity (Time for Action, P 46-56).
The objectives o f CARICOM, as set out in Article 4 o f the Treaty o f Chaguaramas, were as 
follows:
(a) The econom ic integration o f the Member States by the establishment o f a common market regime (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Common Market") in accordance with the provisions o f the Annex to this Treaty with the following aims:-
i. The strengthening coordination and regulation o f the economic and trade relations among Member States 
in order to promote their accelerated harmonious and balanced development;
ii. The sustained expansion and continuing integration of economic activities, the benefits o f which shall be 
equitably shared taking into account the need to provide special opportunities for the Less Developed 
Countries;
iii. The achievement of a greater measure of economic independence and effectiveness o f its Member States 
in dealing with States, groups o f States and entities o f whatever description;
(b) The coordination of the foreign policies of Member States; and
(c) Functional cooperation, including:
i. The efficient operation of certain common services and activities for the benefit o f  its peoples;
A detailed outline of the sequence of events, with appropriate dates, is provided for the interested reader 
in two recent ECLAC publications, entitled: “Evolution of Caribbean Economic Integration - A  Brief Review”, 
LC/CAR/G.424 of 11 July 1994 and “Development o f the Integration Processes in Latin America and the Caribbean”, 
Chapter VI, LC/G. 1527, respectively.
The Common Market was open to participation by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. The Bahamas subsequently became a member of the Community though not o f  the Common Market while 
Suriname was admitted to both in 1995.
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ii. The promotion of greater understanding among its peoples and the advancement o f their social, cultural 
and technological development;
iii. Activities in the fields specified in the Schedule and referred to Article 18 o f this Treaty4.
The OECS5, building on the foundations of the West Indies Associated States Agreement, was 
established in 1981. Its objectives were set out in Article 3, as follows:
1. The major purposes of the Organization shall be:
(a) To promote cooperation among the Member States and at the regional and international levels having due 
regard to the Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community and the Charter o f  the United Nations;
(b) To promote unity and solidarity among the Member States and to defend their sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence;
(c) To assist the Member States in the realization of their obligations and responsibilities to the international 
community with due regard to the role o f international law as a standard o f conduct in their relationship;
(d) To seek to achieve the fullest possible harmonization o f foreign policy among the Member States; to seek 
to adopt, as far as possible, common positions on international issues and to establish and maintain 
wherever possible, arrangements for joint overseas representation and/or common services;
(e) To promote economic integration among the Member States through the provisions o f the Agreement 
Establishing the East Caribbean Common Market; and
(f) To pursue the said purposes through its respective institutions by discussion o f questions o f  common 
concern and by agreement and common action.
2. To this end the Member States will endeavor to co-ordinate, harmonize and pursue joint policies particularly in 
the fields of>
(a) External relations including overseas representation;
(b) International trade agreements and other external economic relations;
(c) Financial and technical assistance from external sources;
(d) International marketing o f goods and services including tourism;
(e) External transportation and communications including civil aviation;
(f) Economic integration among the member states through the provisions o f the agreement establishing the 
East Caribbean Common Market;
Article 18 refers to Functional Cooperation
5 The OECS was open to participation by Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St.
Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The British Virgin Islands was subsequently admitted as an 
observer.
(g) Matters relating to the sea and its resources;
(h) The judiciary;
(i) Currency and central banking;
(j) Audit;
(k) Statistics;
(1) Income tax administration;
(m) Customs and excise administration,
(n) Tertiary education including university;
(o) Training in public administration and management;
(p) Scientific, technical and cultural co-operation;
(q) Mutual defense and security; and
- (r) Such other activities calculated to further the purposes o f the Organization as the Member States may 
from time to time decide.
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FROM CHAGUARAMAS TO GRAND ANSE
In both instances the scope o f the respective agreements extended well beyond its centre­
piece, which was the Common Market. Essentially, this set of ubiquitous activities, mainly relating 
to the coordination o f foreign policies and the spawning o f functional cooperation, fall outside o f the 
purview of this paper. The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the University o f the West 
Indies (UWI) solidly underpin development efforts in the region. Other areas o f functional 
cooperation include finance, health, education, disaster preparedness, and so on. These activities had 
all evolved to serve the membership well6.
It was the goal o f economic integration, through the Common Market, which appeared at 
Article 4 (a) of the CARICOM treaty and Article 3 1 .(e) of the treaty establishing the OECS, which 
proved the most elusive, difficult to implement and upon which judgement o f the success o f both 
treaties tended to rest. It was also the area which greatly complicated the policy calculus, since the 
Common Market interposed a third layer of decision making which needed to be consistent with the 
domestic and foreign policy o f member States.
In view of the elevated hopes which its proponents had for the Common Market, the sense 
o f  disappointment experienced at its lack of progress at the Grand Anse Meeting 1989, and 
subsequently by the West Indian Commission, was not entirely surprising. Given their small size and 
the similarity in their factor endowments, the range of products which CARICOM members could 
meaningfully exchange among themselves was limited. Accordingly, the percentage o f trade which 
CARICOM countries conducted among themselves seldom exceeded 10 per cent of merchandise 
trade7.
This proportion of regional trade showed little prospect o f secular growth. Instead it 
manifested an unusually high degree of vulnerability to the tempo of external earnings in the member 
countries, in part because several import substituting products were being inefficiently produced, 
some being net users of foreign exchange. A second factor was the beggar-thy-neighbour philosophy 
which favoured the in-group at the expense of outsiders. In reasonably good times such attitudes 
could be used to divert trade from third countries into the Common Market. However, as economic 
activities contracted, the same attitudes worked against the Common Market to further divert trade 
from the Common Market to national producers. Common Market provisions were accordingly 
breached with licences, quantitative restrictions or foreign exchange controls applied to limit trade 
with regional partners.
Exceptions might be found in initiatives to provide common air and sea transportation services. These
suffered the fate of many other public sector organizations in the region during the 1980s and 1990s, o f being inefficiently 
run and demanding subsidies from the public purse, which could not be sustained in a period o f declining revenues. 
Accordingly, they were either closed or divested.
7 If petroleum products were excluded CARICOM trade fluctuated between 5-8 per cent o f the total.
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The tempo of export earnings of the three largest economies was subject to large fluctuations 
in the period from the mid- 1960s into the 1980s. At the beginning o f this period, the bauxite 
producers, Jamaica and Guyana, experienced a rapid growth in export earnings. This in turn increased 
the tempo of domestic economic activities, financing expansionary public sector policies and several 
import substituting industries, justified under various guises, including employment creation. By the 
mid- 1970s bauxite/alumina earnings began to contract and Jamaica and Guyana were simultaneously 
faced with greatly augmented energy costs, consequent on the first oil price increase in 1973. 
Conversely, Trinidad and Tobago obtained earnings windfalls, the 1973 and 1979 oil price increases 
providing strong positive impulses to government revenues and the balance of payments and 
stimulated boom conditions until the early 1980s. Here also the windfall stimulated public and private 
sector activities, until about 1982 when economic expansion became dependent on fiscal and external 
deficits. These economic shocks together with inadequate policy responses created the need for rapid 
adjustment (ECLAC, 1993).
Adjustment was slow and public deficits difficult to reduce, so that persistent borrowing 
rapidly increased the debt. In Guyana, the external debt moved from 35 per cent o f GDP in 1970 to 
122 percent in 1980 and about 300 per cent by 1986. In Jamaica, the external debt stood at 16 per 
cent of GDP in 1970, 65 per cent in 1980 peaking at 178 per cent 1985. Both countries experienced 
a significant contraction in product and the standard o f living of their people. The accumulated debt 
continued to have a debilitating effect on these economies a decade later.
In Trinidad and Tobago, the aftermath of the oil boom saw an economic contraction o f 33 per 
cent between 1983-1989, with unemployment doubling over the same period. External debt grew 
somewhat less precipitously, from under 10 per cent o f GDP in 1980 to about 30 per cent in 1988, 
but subsequent debt servicing efforts were to greatly complicate economic management here also. 
The fourth o f the CARICOM MDCs, Barbados, was spared the magnitude o f adjustment required 
by the minerals exporters, simply because it did not benefit from a minerals boom and did not emulate 
government profligacy elsewhere. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s that economy was also in 
disequilibrium and required an adjustment programme of its own, although the policy shift was not 
as complete in Barbados as in the other MDCs (ECLAC 1993). In sum, all four MDCs experienced 
external shocks and needed new policies to improve their export earning capacity. In several 
instances these policies conflicted with the traditional West Indian model o f development.
Developments in the OECS were somewhat different. The statutes o f their joint Central Bank, 
the ECCB, limited the scope for member governments to pursue expansionary fiscal policies when 
the economy was dormant. This policy was beneficial for the OECS countries, a fact not lost on other 
CARICOM members, some of which sought to emulate it under common currency arrangements. 
The main export crop for most o f them, bananas, was also covered by a preferential trade regime with 
the EU, under which production flourished. Finally, tourism services developed rapidly in most of 
these countries so that economic performance as a whole was buoyant in this period. This relative 
success reduced the urgency for policy reform, however, so that these countries remain dependent 
on banana preferences which have a finite life. Several policy reforms have become necessary.
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By the end of the 1980s trade liberalization was being reintroduced by those countries which 
experienced the most severe economic disequilibrium. For them, as for all small economies, hard 
currency earnings played a pivotal role in their economic expansion and became especially critical 
if they were to meet their outstanding external debt obligations. Improved export performance was, 
therefore, the means to establish equilibrium and achieve sustained growth. Policies to favour the 
production of tradable goods and services over non-tradables were applied, beginning with measures 
to increase economic efficiency and reduce the various policy biases against export activities. These 
began with restrictive fiscal and monetary measures and realignments of the real exchange rate. 
Subsequently, exchange rate regimes were often modified to ensure that the market would play a 
greater role in determining rates than hitherto, in the hope of avoiding the gross misalignments which 
had developed when rates were administratively fixed. Once domestic demand was contained, these 
governments felt sufficiently confident to focus on several medium-term policies, such as the foreign 
investment codes and deregulation o f the financial system.
Attention was also placed on the trade regime, the emphasis being to eliminate the remaining 
anti-export biases inherent in the tariff structure and the administrative arrangements governing trade. 
But the pace of domestic reform was uneven in some instances since existing CARICOM policies, 
based on a consensus, habitually inhibited the pace of change in those areas covered by common 
regional positions. In several instances, trade policies lagged other domestic macroeconomic policies 
and created tensions with them. Undertakings were frequently ignored or tardy in their 
implementation, so that frustrations developed within the regional grouping among those wishing to 
push ahead with economic reform (ECLAC, 1995).
Tensions, therefore, developed between domestic adjustment policies, increasingly outward 
looking and CARICOM policies still based essentially on import substituting policies. These tensions 
came to a head in 1989 in Grand Anse and prompted a new look at the integration movement by the 
West Indian Commission.
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GRAND ANSE - THE TURNING POINT
The CARICOM heads of government, at their tenth meeting at Grand Anse, Grenada, in July 
1989, acted to give new impetus to CARICOM8. They were motivated in almost equal measure by 
concerns about poor economic performance at home, failure by CARICOM to achieve its: stated 
objectives and the turn of events internationally, which seemed to threaten CARICOM, on one hand,, 
and create new uncertainties and insecurities for its member governments, on the other. In their 
declaration, the Heads asserted “..the need to work expeditiously together to deepen the integration 
process and strengthen the Caribbean Community in all its dimensions to respond to the challenges 
and opportunities presented by the changes in the global economy” (CARICOM, 1989). They agreed, 
to several follow-up activities, notably, the establishment o f a single market and economy, identifying 
13 measures which would need to be completed by 19939. They also proposed the establishment of 
an Independent West Indian Commission to advise them on advancing the goals of the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas.
The 13 points to be addressed were as follows:
1. The three common market instruments, the Common External Tariff (CET), the Rules 
o f Origin, and a Harmonized Scheme of Fiscal Incentives were to be revised, agreed and effective by 
January 1991;
2. Strengthening of customs cooperation and administrations for the move to a customs
union;
3. Signature o f the agreement establishing the CARICOM Industrial Programming 
Scheme (CIPS), by September 1989;
4. Enactment of legislation to give effect to CIPS and the CARICOM Enterprise Regime 
(CER), by January 1990;
5. A scheme for the movement o f capital, starting with the cross listing ¡and trading of 
securities on existing stock exchanges;
6. Establishment of a regional equity/venture capital fund;
7. The CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility (CMCF), strengthened and re­
established for current and capital transactions, by December 1990;
This section evaluates the period between the Tenth Heads o f Government Conference in July 1989 and 
the Sixteenth Heads o f Government Conference in July 1995.
9 July 1993 was symbolic, since it represented 20 years after the Treaty o f Chaguaramas had created
CARICOM.
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8. Further arrangements for strengthening consultation and cooperation on monetary, 
financial and exchange rate policies, by July 1990;
9. The removal o f all remaining barriers to trade, by July 1991;
10. The immediate activation of article 39 o f the Annex o f the Treaty o f Chaguaramas, 
in order to promote consultation, cooperation and coordination o f policies o f the macroeconomic, 
sectoral and project levels;
11. Free movement of skilled and professional, as well as contract workers, on a seasonal 
or project basis, by January 1991;
12. Immediate and continuous action to develop a regional air and sea transportation 
system, by 4 July 1992; and
13. Greater collective effort at joint representation in international economic negotiations 
and the sharing of facilities and offices to this end, with immediate effect.
The West Indian Commission held its first meeting in April 1990. It submitted a progress 
report to the heads o f government in July 1991 and its final report to the heads o f government in 
1992. Among its recommendations were proposals for: the creation o f single market and economy; 
shaping CARICOM’s external relations, especially for widening its relations, to the non-CARICOM 
Caribbean, Central and South American countries; and, the establishment o f several structures for 
strengthening unity in the region, one o f which, the establishment o f a permanent commission to 
oversee the implementation o f Community decisions, was not approved (Time for Action, 1992).
The old dichotomy which had long existed between deepening integration and widening it was 
finessed by the Commission, which stated that they were symbiotic. The call for a single market and 
economy,(or Economic Union), was seen as the means to create some critical mass in resources and 
in negotiating capacity, especially as it related to the next major initiative o f CARICOM, which was 
to widen its relations. The report stated that “The West Indies must both deepen the process of 
integration to which it has set its hand and reach out to the wider Caribbean at appropriate levels of 
cooperation” (Time for Action, P 443).
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THE SINGLE M ARKET AND ECONOM Y - DEEPENING CARICOM
After the passage of 16 years since the Treaty of Chaguaramas was signed, the single market 
was still some way from being achieved and still ill-defined. In 1989 CARICOM was a mixed 
structure, containing elements o f a Free Trade Area and a Customs Union although achieving 
complete compliance in neither. Given that the bald proposal for a single market and economy could 
be interpreted to lie somewhere on a continuum between an economic union and total economic 
integration and since political union had been explicitly ruled out previously, a process o f sensitivity 
analysis was necessary to find a politically acceptable set of outer limits to fit the mandate.
Elements of the single m arket and economy
The West Indian Commission gave some flesh to the concept, as deemed appropriate to 
CARICOM circumstances, as follows: “Technically a single market involves a market structured and 
functioning to a large extent as if it were within the borders of a single country. There must therefore 
be the freedom of movement of goods, services, labour and capital and supportive fiscal and monetary 
measures and administrative arrangements.... while many policy functions may be carried out at the 
national level, these should be conducted within a coordinated policy framework at the regional level” 
(Time for Action, P 104).
The CARICOM Secretariat also engaged in consultations o f its own, to define an acceptable 
framework for its membership (CARICOM, lune 1991). It was eventually agreed that the progression 
to a single market would proceed in the following steps: free trade area; customs union; the single 
market; and the single economy (CARICOM, June 1992).
The free trade area would require several measures for its completion. These included the 
elimination o f all remaining tariffs, quotas, and other non-tariff barriers to CARICOM trade; the 
acceptance of common standards by the trading partners, to ensure acceptability o f the goods traded; 
the adoption of rules o f origin; improved transport for goods and factors; and, the promotion of 
regional production (CARICOM, 1992).
The customs union would be consolidated with the implementation of:
(a) A revised CET ;
(b) A common trade policy to liberalize trade for the internal market, to develop joint 
representation in international negotiations and develop consultation and coordination arrangements 
for bilateral agreements, within a common agreed framework.
(c) Uniform customs laws and simplified and harmonized customs procedures;
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(d) Expanded trade and economic relations through bilateral or membership arrangements 
with Central or South American countries to widen the market for goods and services;
(e) The issue of the free circulation of extra-regional goods and services, requiring the 
regional collection and sharing of customs revenues, was deferred in view o f the high level o f external 
trade which entered each island directly at established ports through their own customs facilities.
The single m arket would need the following additional measures to ensure its completion: 
free movement o f services; financial integration, including the free movement o f capital; the free 
movement o f labour; rights of establishment, which conferred national treatment on regional 
investment.
Finally, the single economy would require the following additional measures for its 
completion:
(a) More extensive coordination of monetary and fiscal policies relating to exchange rates,
interest rates, commercial banking, fiscal policies, and the re-establishment o f the regional clearing 
arrangements, in the absence of monetary union;
(b) Deepened economic policies via consultation and coordination on both domestic and 
external economic policies, harmonization o f foreign investment policies, laws governing intellectual 
property, anti-dumping etc., schemes for technology development acquisition and transfer;
Further supporting measures were proposed, which would be needed to better manage the 
process leading to the single market and economy. These would cut across all stages o f the process 
and included: a scheme for disadvantaged regions; a publicity campaign to involve people at all levels; 
institutional reforms to improve decision-making and better coordinate policy at the national level; 
measures to improve the functioning of the Secretariat; and arrangements to better coordinate with 
the social partners.
These measures went far beyond the original treaty as noted by the West Indian Commission, 
“The terms o f the Treaty (of Chaguaramas) are not so much outdated as in need o f renewal or 
expansion. New imperatives require new responses and a new framework in which they can be 
accommodated” (Time for Action, P 19-20). It was stated that after 20 years there was need for a 
successor treaty.
Progress towards the single m arket and economy
Since Grand Anse the programme of work defined there and refined by the West Indian 
Commission and successive CARICOM meetings, had constituted CARICOM’s priority work 
programme. Work relating to the single market and economy tended to coalesce into three clusters 
of activities: the free trade of goods services and factors; the payments regime and capital movements; 
and the maintenance of a common economic stance to the rest of the world.
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With respect to the first cluster, initial focus was on the removal o f all barriers to intra- 
CARICOM trade in goods. This had been substantially achieved, although three countries were still 
to fully comply. One country still needed to implement legislation to abolish licences for CARICOM 
goods while the other two still retained licences for some regional agricultural products. While 
mandatory common standards to govern the quality of traded goods had been prepared by the 
secretariat, some countries were not yet prepared to enforce them, so that they would only be 
voluntary, at this stage.
The issue of improved transport remained unresolved. Initially it was assumed that this would 
be best achieved by CARICOM member countries through public sector financed and controlled 
transportation arrangements. This proved not to be viable, since large government subsidies were 
riecessary for their operation. It remains to be seen whether better arrangements can be made by 
regional institutions, such as the CARICOM Export Development Council (CEDC), with private 
operators. The regional airlines had been, or in the case o f the Leeward Islands Air Transport 
Company (LIAT), was about to be, privatized. The West Indies Shipping Corporation (WISCO), the 
regional shipping company was insolvent, with a decision made by CARICOM to terminate its 
activities in July 1992. Outstanding debts by member governments had to be repaid, however, before 
the books could be closed.
Efforts were under way to promote regional trade. The Caribbean Export Development 
Programme (CEDP), had started several activities, including the publication o f a Directory of 
Caribbean Exporters; the circulation of a Business Opportunities Bulletin; and the preparation of 
market briefs outlining the procurement systems in member countries and identifying trade 
opportunities for regional goods and services in the government sectors. It was also proposed that 
a clearing house would be established to deal with national tenders across the region. Studies were 
also to be conducted to suggest ways to improve trade data in the region and to determine the impact 
of the FT AA on CARICOM production Finally, a “Buy Caribbean” programme had been launched 
in several CARICOM countries and the “Buy Caribbean” logo instituted. This seal o f approval had 
already been awarded to some CARICOM originating products which met approved standards.
A revised CET was not achieved in 1991, as mandated at Grand Anse. In fact the original 
CET had not yet been implemented by all countries at that date. Nevertheless, by mid-1995 the 
revised CET had achieved, more or less, full compliance. Similarly, the Rules o f Origin did not meet 
the deadline, but compliance has now been achieved. The CET was guided by the principle that 
imports which competed with regional goods should incur higher tariff rates. Also, final consumption 
goods would incur higher rates than inputs or capital goods. Nevertheless, the tariff was riddled with 
exemptions.
The revised CET was divided into four stages, taking effect in January 1993 and gradually 
reducing tariffs in 1995, 1997 and ending with a tariff range of between 5-20 per cent beginning 1998, 
for all goods except agricultural products. It was, however, a compromise and no sooner had it been




CARICOM - COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF RATES
1-1-1993 to 31-12-1994 1-1-1995 to 31-12-1996 1-1-1997 to 31-12-1997 1-1-1998
Agricultural Inputs 0 0 0 0
Non-competing primary inputs 5 (LDCs 0-5) 5 (LDCs 0-5) 5 (LDCs 0-5) 5 (LDCs 0-5)
Non-competing intermediate inputs " •
Non-competing capital inputs " " •
Competing primary inputs 20 15 10 10
Competing capital goods » " " *
Selected imports " " "
Competing intermediate inputs 25 20 15 *5
Non-competing final goods 25 25-30 20-25 20
Agro-industry 30-35 25-30 20-25 20
Garments " " •
General manufactures " " * "
Agriculture 40 40 40 40
LISTA Suspended rates Suspended rates - -
LÎSTB Suspended rates LDCs Suspended rates LDCs - -
LIST C Minimum rates Minimum rates Minimum rates Minimum rates
LIST D Parts I and III Suspended rates LDCs Suspended rates LDCs - -
Safety 0 0 - *
Cost o f  living 0-20 0-20 -
Socio-economic and socio-cultural ■ -
Range of CET (Agriculture) 0-4(1 0-40 0-40 0-40
Range of CET (Non-agriculture) 5-35 5-30 5-25 5-20
Source; CARICOM, October 1992
agreed than pressure was being placed for a review of its terms. Attitudes to protectionism in the 
region were varied and evolving. Some were concerned about the cost-of-living effects o f the tariff. 
Some were concerned with the bias it created against export activities, many believing that the CET 
still accorded too much protection and needed to fall further. It was also believed that the dispersion 
between tariff categories was too great, so that several changes were needed if a smooth transition 
to the FTAA was to be achieved. Others were more reluctant to reduce tariff protection and even if 
willing to concede a reduction, maintained that it should not be done unilaterally, but rather bargained 
away for commensurate benefit in extraregional negotiations. Funding was being sought to prepare 
a modified tariff and to revise the Rules o f Origin to make them compatible.
The policy towards regional production was addressed through the CARICOM Industrial 
Programming Scheme, the CARICOM Enterprise Regime and the Caribbean Community Programme 
for Agricultural Development (CCPAD). The CIPS was intended to take advantage of the critical 
mass being built within the Common Market, by identifying the most likely location for an industry 
deemed to be o f high priority and intended for incorporation into the regional production structure. 
The CER would provide preferential tax and financial treatment and preferential tariff protection,
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where necessary. The first regional projects were identified in 1985 but by Grand Anse little progress 
had been made. The declaration, therefore, proposed that legislation to give effect to the CIPS.-and 
the CER should be adopted by January 1990. Despite this mandate progress remained slow and the 
eighteenth Standing Committee o f Ministers o f Finance (SCMF) asked the Secretariat to undertake 
a review of the CER.
The Heads of Government in 1995 were informed that several developments had taken place 
which were removing the impediments to intraregional economic activity, impediments which the 
CER \Vas intended to circumvent. Cross border investments were being made without the CER which 
was being generally ignored by regional investors. The Heads accordingly agreed to terminate the 
CER.
This set of measures comprised a bold attempt by regional bureaucrats to identify, locate and 
foster key regional industries. The policy was, however, formed without the participation o f the 
private sector which would be expected to implement it and perhaps with less concern for viability 
than they might have wished. CARICOM policy had also shifted somewhat since these instruments 
were devised. Less emphasis was being placed on rigid programming of activities, the hope now being 
that the free movement o f factors within the single market would provide sufficient incentives for 
regional investors to quicken economic activity. More significantly, early national policies 
incorporated several impediments to external investment, so that special measures were needed to 
negate them within CARICOM. With the liberalization of national economies, investment from all 
sources was being encouraged and this would benefit CARICOM investors equally. Liberalization 
was also expected to facilitate the movement of some factors from outside the single economy, 
primarily capita] and skills.
Attitudes to the Harmonization of Fiscal Incentives had also evolved. The exercise to 
harmonize fiscal incentives had been long delayed with the latest timetable suggesting that a 
programme o f harmonized incentives to industry should commence in 1997. Currently, the 
CARICOM position was that incentives need to be seen as a whole and in the context o f overall 
harmonized macroeconomic policy (CARICOM, 1995). Concealed within that bald statement was 
a spectrum of conflicting views, on fiscal monetary exchange rate and industry policy.
In the past, tax holidays constituted a major policy tool in the region. Several activities were 
spawned under that policy and some investors developed a policy o f skipping from one country to 
another on expiry of the holiday, shopping for the best conditions. Some still advanced the view that 
promising activities or sectors should be identified and the necessary fiscal and other supports 
provided to encourage them, though these should be controlled or harmonized to prevent competition 
between members. Others proposed that incentives, if any, should be horizontal, that is they should 
be systemic, helping to improve productivity across all sectors, for example through more 
sophisticated education or communications policies.
Incentive policies also had implications for trade policy since some incentives, for example 
subsidized inputs to certain export products would attract penalties under various bilateral trade
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agreements and under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In this instance, it was 
necessary for the framers of new legislation to be alert to the probable outcomes o f market widening.
Divergence also existed with respect to the fiscal and monetary policies applied by CARICOM 
members. Differences in the exchange rate regime were discussed elsewhere. Taxation regimes also 
differed with some countries shifting away from import taxes to Value Added Tax (VAT) regimes. 
In conclusion, while it made logical sense to analyze incentives programmes within the totality of 
macroeconomic policies, it was doubtful that any one set of macro policies would prove optimal, or 
acceptable, to CARICOM members at any one time. Seeking to reach identity was not only difficult 
but it also might prove to be inappropriate.
The free movement of CARICOM citizens covered two issues. Ease o f travel within the 
region and the unfettered movement of labour. The West Indian Commission, among others, noted 
that the Caribbean, being a tourist region had facilitated travel by tourists from outside the region by 
giving them special treatment in arrival halls and by liberalizing the documentation required for entry 
to include drivers licences or identity cards, in some instances. Yet, CARICOM nationals had not 
been accorded any of these facilities and faced many impediments to travel within the region. The free 
movement o f labour was also considered to be an integral part o f the single economy, to which all 
countries subscribed. The West Indian Commission also suggested that members should strive for the 
goal o f full freedom of movement within CARICOM (Time for Action, P 142).
With respect to “hassle free” travel, CARICOM nationals were granted special lines at 
airports in most countries and measures had been taken to sensitize customs and immigration and 
other officials to the policies relating to “hassle free” travel within CARICOM. Arrangements were 
also being made to allow those citizens of CARICOM member countries without passports to travel 
within the group, with CARICOM identity cards being considered for that purpose.
The other goal, the free movement of labour throughout CARICOM, seemed to be some way 
from being realized. Fears arose because o f the high rates o f unemployment which existed in some 
countries and the surges in population movement which might occur if restrictions were lifted. The 
Bahamas, which had faced a problem of illegal migration for some time opted out o f the scheme from 
the start and most others have been reluctant to permit the unregulated flow o f unskilled labour, 
despite the need for unskilled migrant workers in several countries. Progress was, however, being 
made on the free movement of skilled workers, beginning with the free movement o f university 
graduates in 1996, subject to the acceptability o f their credentials by the member State concerned. 
Progress was also being made in reducing impediments for workers providing certain services. 
Several countries were also in the process of adhering to the CARICOM Agreement on Social 
Security, which was to come into effect in 1996 and was intended to remove one disincentive to the 
movement o f skills.
Several other issues relating to the opening o f the regional market were pending, in many 
instances awaiting draft legislation before being considered for implementation. These included the 
framing of uniform customs laws. Currently customs officials met regularly and among other things,
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arranged that the more glaring impediments to trade were removed, but harmonized customs 
procedures were awaiting the drafting and agreement of model legislation. A protocol was also being 
proposed to cover Establishment and the movement o f Services and Capital. In the interim, 
discussions continued, to seek modifications to the Aliens Landholding Laws, to ensure that the term 
“alien” did not refer to the citizens of CARICOM countries.
(b) The payments regime and capital movements '
With respect to the second cluster of issues, several actions had been initially proposed, many 
o f which would be made redundant if monetary union was achieved or alternatively, if liberalized 
foreign exchange regimes were adopted at the national level. Monetary union, in turn would require 
a high level o f coordination of macroeconomic policy. The Grand Anse Declaration began fairly 
modestly with a scheme for the movement of capital, starting with the cross listing and trading of 
securities. It also called for strengthened consultation and cooperation on monetary financial and 
exchange rate policies. The subsequent Heads of Government Meeting in Kingston in 1990, however, 
called on the Central Bankers, “to work towards the coordination o f the establishment o f a Monetary 
Union.” This was later supported by the Report of the West Indian Commission, which called for the 
establishment o f a common West Indian currency, administered by an Independent Monetary 
Authority. While the Commission recognized that all countries were not currently eligible for 
membership, it proposed that the authority could begin with those which qualified and others would 
converge to it once they met the criteria10. Also, the convertibility o f regional currencies should be 
secured, at the earliest possible stage.
The desire for a common currency arose from two concerns. The first was the price and 
currency instability being experienced by some countries and the expectation that once they had 
achieved the convergence criteria, they would be locked into a union with a fixed exchange rate, thus 
securing stability, thereafter. The second concern was the high cost of transacting business in a region 
with several currencies, changing exchange rates and the sheer burden of exchange controls. This 
seemed to be viewed primarily from the perspective o f the single market, although third country 
transactions which amounted to about 90 per cent of the total were equally handicapped.
After examining the issues, it was concluded that several constraints currently worked against 
the formation of a monetary union. These included: differences in exchange rate regimes; absence of 
convergence of current macroeconomic performance; the short-and long-term costs associated with 
monetary integration; foreign exchange shortages; and the political dimensions involved, including 
a durable affinity to national currencies. With respect to CARICOM payments, specifically the 
repatriation of currencies, it noted that a mixed arrangement would be necessary. Those countries 
with fixed exchange rates would continue to operate repatriation arrangements through the Central 
Banks. Those countries with liberalized foreign exchange regimes and floating exchange rates would
10 The convergence criteria were, essentially, a stable exchange rate for 36 months, stable foreign reserves 
equivalent to three months o f import cover for 12 consecutive months without abnormal borrowing; and, manageable debt 
service ratios, projected as less than 15 per cent of exports.
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conduct private transactions through the commercial banks, which would make their own 
arrangements for repatriation. For the latter countries, official transactions would be conducted 
through the Central Banks at a rate determined by the issuing country (Central Bank Task Force, 
January 1995).
It was, therefore, concluded that monetary union was not currently feasible. However, it was 
strongly recommended by the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Finance, that all 
member countries should restore currency convertibility and remove all exchange controls, and 
member States which still had such controls should specify a deadline by which they would be 
removed. The SCMF also endorsed the view that the economic indicators needed to monitor the 
convergence of macroeconomic policies should be expanded and that the Central Bank governors 
should be empowered to play a more active role in encouraging policy convergence. They also 
recommended more frequent consultations among CARICOM member States on macroeconomic 
policies and in setting macroeconomic targets.
Given the spectrum of opinions on the issue of monetary integration, it was perhaps 
understandable that the SCMF rendered an ambivalent judgement on Monetary Union. Central to the 
decision was the recognition that exchange controls should be removed on all transactions, and not 
only on the small fraction pertinent to the single market. Indirectly, the SCMF also seemed to be 
saying something about the exchange rate regime, which was that if one chose to operate with fixed 
exchange rates this should not be achieved by suppressing payments. Not only was a lack o f policy 
convergence identified, but there was also evidence of divergence in economic performance (ECLAC, 
1995). It was also recognized that the quantum of reserves necessary to operate a credible Caribbean 
Monetary Union (CMU), with fixed rates, in the face of growing liberalization o f markets, might be 
quite considerable.
The Sixteenth Heads of Government Conference agreed to mandate the Council o f Central 
Bank Governors to take a more active role in facilitating convergence by assuming some of the policy 
advisory functions which were envisaged for the CMU. Whether this policy to facilitate convergence 
would lead to the CMU remained uncertain. Given the wider range of economic indicators to be 
monitored, however, this move could greatly facilitate the other objective o f coordinating 
macroeconomic policy and might, by virtue of pooling ideas, skills and experience and by subjecting 
short-term stratagems to scrutiny, hopefully improve the performance o f all member countries.
Other priorities included the establishment o f a legal and regulatory framework and 
institutional arrangements for the development of the regional capital market; the development and 
expansion of secondary markets for trading securities; and the adoption o f a definition o f the term 
“aliens” which would exclude CARICOM nationals.
Finally, the CARICOM CMCF was reviewed in the light o f the foregoing developments. The 
CARICOM heads decided that it should not be reactivated or any other similar facility instituted, at 
this time. They also noted that current bilateral payments arrangements were considered to be 
satisfactory.
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The CMCF had a checkered career, the idea being resuscitated at Grand Anse, where a 
deadline o f December 1990 was set for its strengthening and reopening for current and capital 
transactions. The CMCF was established in 1977, to provide a devise to give preference to 
CARICOM trade in circumventing the exchange controls which operated in virtually all member 
countries. By then, however, two MDCs were already experiencing severe balance o f payments 
deficits. While the CMCF was able to facilitate trade up to early 1983, the disequilibrium in Guyana 
was so severe that its debt to other CARICOM members exhausted the resources o f the fund, which 
had to be suspended. Subsequent efforts to collect the outstanding debt or replenish it were 
unsuccessful. Simultaneously, the rationale for the fund was being undermined, since action was being 
taken to liberalize foreign exchange regimes and re-establish convertible currencies in several 
countries. The facility remains on the books, however, since it cannot be terminated until outstanding 
debts are settled.
(c) The maintenance o f a common economic stance to the rest o f the world
The Treaty o f Chaguaramas referred to a common policy stance vis-à-vis third countries in 
several places: in the section relating to the objectives o f the Community, Article 4(b), which 
identified the coordination of foreign policy as one objective; in the section o f the Common Market 
Treaty dealing with External Trade Policy, Article 34, which enjoined members to seek a progressive 
coordination o f their trade relations with third countries or groups o f countries; and again in the 
Common Market Treaty, in Article 39 l(iii), where members shall seek, as far as practicable, to 
coordinate their positions and presentations at all international economic, financial and trade meetings 
at which they are represented.
The Declaration of Grand Anse proposed a greater collective effort at joint representation in 
international economic negotiations and the sharing of facilities and offices, with immediate effect. 
Concerns of “marginalization” also motivated the West Indian Commission to propose that 
CARICOM countries adopt a collective approach to current and potential changes in the international 
community....and reflect this approach in common arrangements for international economic 
negotiations and diplomatic representation11.
Foreign policy is conducted essentially by States. The CARICOM treaties recognize this, de 
jure and de facto, by asking States to coordinate their positions. The West Indian Commission, while 
recognizing the foregoing, seemed to give a nuance to this reality. It seemed to make a case for 
CARICOM interests or relations as distinct from national interests, to which the latter would need 
to subordinate themselves to a system of sanctions, in the event of non-compliance, if the former was 
to maintain its coherence (Time for Action, P 424). The EU experience was given as precedent. The 
distinction would seem to be whether this set of activities would be considered to remain at the level 
o f functional cooperation or become an integral to the Caribbean economic union.
This concern was highlighted in the context o f CARICOM/hemispheric relationships which will be
analyzed later.
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Any evaluation of progress following the West Indian Commission would turn on this nuance. 
A comprehensive programme of coordination continued between member States, several instances 
occurring o f a single spokesman being appointed to speak on behalf o f CARICOM, o f member 
countries agreeing to support single candidates for international positions or o f coordinated positions 
being agreed to in various international forums. Similarly, the agreements between CARICOM and 
various third countries or groups continued to evolve, under joint supervision.
Finally, under the programme of harmonized legislation priority was being accorded to 
legislation relating to anti-dumping, fair competition and restrictive practices, banking and securities 
and the development of capital markets, intellectual property, and issues pertaining to maritime 
boundaries. All o f these issues would codify common CARICOM policies vis-à-vis third countries.
Nevertheless, despite the impressive list of practical areas of cooperation, the element of 
subordination seemed still not to be conceded and joint overseas representation, except among certain 
OECS countries, seemed not yet to have taken hold.
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EXPANDED ECONOMIC RELATIONS - WIDENING CARICOM
Thé strategy for widening
The strategy for widening CARICOM, as proposed by the West Indian Commission, involved, 
“¿ircles o f association that start with the intimate West Indian family and others that encompass the 
extended family of the non-English speaking islands of the Caribbean, and a still larger circle o f closer 
relations with countries of the Caribbean basin that includes territories o f the South and Central 
American littoral” (Time for Action, P. 444). The objective was, therefore, not simply to expand the 
CARICOM core, although this was not ruled out for the larger adjacent Caribbean islands, once 
appropriate internal and external circumstances existed12. However, a precondition for CARICOM 
to broaden its relations was the existence of a tight CARICOM core, which would act in unity in its 
dealings with other countries in the region. A clear priority and time sequence were, however, 
envisaged for the initiatives, since, “Deepening of CARICOM must be achieved in order to make 
widening and closer economic association workable” (Demas 1995). In terms o f timing, it would be 
necessary to “Deepen quickly while beginning to widen” (Demas 1995).
Recent developments
The centrepiece in the strategy for widening, the creation of the Association o f Caribbean 
States (ACS), as proposed by the West Indian Commission, was agreed at the inter-sessional meeting 
of the Heads of Government, in October 1992. After a series of regional preparatory meetings, the 
convention establishing the ACS was signed in Cartagena de las Indias, Colombia, on 24 July 1994. 
The inaugural Summit of Heads of State and Government and representatives o f the States, Countries 
and Territories of the ACS was held in Trinidad and Tobago, the site o f its headquarters, from 16-18 
August 1995. A Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action on Tourism, Trade and Transportation 
was agreed and signed by the new members.13
The second part o f the strategy on widening, as envisaged by the West Indian Commission 
was also proceeding on schedule. That strategy proposed the negotiation o f preferential bilateral 
agreements between CARICOM; as a unit, and its major trading partners. It was also envisaged that 
the ACS might provide the vehicle for such agreements as well as in fostering functional cooperation. 
“We believe it could be the means of our creating within the wider Caribbean special trading and
Sunname was accepted into CARICOM in July 1995. Haiti and the Dominican Republic attend certain 
o f the functional cooperation committees as obseiwers. A CARICOM/Cuba Joint Commission was established and thé 
proposal to sigh a Trade and Investment Agreement was being studied.
13 The membership consisted of: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 
M exico and Venezuela. Also signing were Anguilla, Araba, France (for Guadeloupe, Guyane and Martinique), the 
Netherlands Antilles, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
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functional cooperation agreements on terms to be negotiated - terms which will recognize the relative 
weakness of CARICOM economies in relation to some o f the larger partners..” (Time for Action, P 
446-447), A somewhat more recent and more explicit formulation was made by Demas, who stated 
that after CARICOM is quickly deepened, a “CARICOM group negotiation o f partial or total free 
trade agreements with the big three o f Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, with the Andean Group, 
the Central American Common Market (CACM) as a group and later on, MERCOSUR, as a group, 
should start”. It was further envisaged that after further deepening within the groups, they would 
establish formal trading and economic links among themselves and with NAFTA “and on that basis 
would eventually become part o f the FTAA. The issue of reciprocity arises in this context”. 
According to this formulation, reciprocity would be considered at the second stage, o f formal 
agreements, although seemingly not for the OECS (Demas, 1995 P. 105).
Several trade initiatives were undertaken, in accordance with the strategy outlined by the West 
Indian Commission. A trade agreement was signed with Venezuela on 1 July 1991, in which free non­
reciprocal access was accorded to CARICOM countries for five years. Explorations began with the 
Central American Common Market (CACM) at the level of foreign ministers in January 1992, where 
agreement was reached in principle to consider the establishment o f a free trade area and the 
coordination of economic policies. A Joint Forum for Consultation and Coordination was established 
for the follow-up. A Free Trade Agreement was signed between Colombia and CARICOM on 24 July
1994. It was also preferential in the sense that while Colombia would begin tariff reduction in 1995, 
CARICOM would be given a four year grace period before beginning its tariff reduction.
The new initiatives were also to be seen in the context of already established non-reciprocal 
trading arrangements with the EU, via the Lome IV, with Canada via the Canada-CARICOM 
Agreement (CARIBCAN), with the United States via the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
(CBI), which CARICOM countries were negotiating to update, via the Caribbean Basin Trade 
Security Bill. The bill sought parity with other NAFTA trade to the United States for 10 years, to the 
year 2005, the date at which the FTAA was due to come into effect. The bill also sought to enshrine 
the benefits o f the bill in law, rather than have them accorded only at the discretion o f the 
President.
So far these initiatives conformed to the CARICOM strategy which was essential to preserve 
its preferential trade arrangements. Cohesion was necessary within CARICOM to maintain the unity 
o f the ranks, while CARICOM, as a whole, implemented a strategy o f managed trade with the rest 
o f the world, via a set of bilateral non-reciprocal trading arrangements.
However, even as these arrangements were being made, several events were unfolding to cast 
doubt on the viability of the managed non-reciprocal trading strategy. Larger and more far reaching 
reciprocal regional trading schemes were created under NAFTA and mooted under the FTAA. Prior 
to the flowering of the FTAA, several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean were positioning 
themselves in an imaginary queue for docking to that agreement and speculation was rife as to 
accession criteria. Two CARICOM members formally indicated a desire to accede to NAFTA.
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The Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in December 1994, committed its participants 
to the establishment o f a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 20Ô5, which would 
seek the progressive elimination o f barriers to trade and investment in the Western Hemisphere14. 
Participants agreed to conclude agreements on several issues, such as tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade in goods and services, agriculture, subsidies, investment, intellectual property rights, 
government procurement, technical barriers to trade, safeguards, rules o f origin, anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties, sanitary and phytosanitary standards and procedures, dispute resolution and 
competition policy. The mood following the inauguration o f the FTAA seemed to  suggest that it had 
superseded NAFTA. The two CARICOM aspirants, nevertheless, continued to press their case for 
accession to NAFTA, presumably hedging against undue delay by aspirants in reaching agreement 
on the terms of entry or diminution of interest on the part o f the United States for the FTAA.
Accession to the FTAA, however, would virtually overturn the CARICOM strategy o f non- 
reciprocal bilateral agreements. If, as expected, reciprocal trade under low tariffs was the basis for 
the FTAA, all bilateral trade agreements in the hemisphere would be made redundant. Moreover, the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause would require reciprocal arrangements with the EU. Seemingly 
in recognition of this eventuality, the Heads of Government meeting in 1995, made a start by 
authorizing reciprocal trade relations between CARICOM MDCs and selected Caribbean and Latin 
American countries. The principle of non-reciprocity would, however, be defended for the LDCs of 
CARICOM .
The completion o f the Uruguay Round o f the GATT and the creation o f the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), with strengthened provisions for multilateralizing trade, provided further 
pointers that preferential trading arrangements would be under threat. Article XXIV o f the GATT 
which governed regional trading arrangements was under scrutiny. A formula for determining average 
tariffs was agreed, transition periods for the formation of FTAs were made more precise, and not to 
exceed 10 years, and attempts were made to ensure that MFN criteria were not circumvented. This 
attempt failed, but will be reopened in time. Improved dispute settlement arrangements were also 
likely to encourage renewed challenges to discriminatory arrangement (Rajapatriana 1994). Recent 
pressure by the United States regarding CARICOM bananas provided an early illustration o f what 
could be expected.
14 Thirty four countries participated in the Summit, as follows. Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts 
and N evis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, the United States of 
America, and Venezuela.
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EVALUATION OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE GRAND ANSE
Grand Anse was essentially a political act, to give impetus to regional policies that were in 
danger of being circumvented. But contrary to the common perception, the way forward required 
more than political will. For instance, technical concerns arose about many o f the proposals, while 
developments at the national level and internationally were evolving to a different tune and at a faster 
tempo than those at the regional level. Proposals which seemed to be appropriate to global and 
regional circumstances in 1973 demanded a réévaluation in the 1990s. The real, though perhaps 
unintended, benefit o f Grand Anse and its aftermath was not simply to increase political momentum 
but to reopen the policy debate for issues to be evaluated on their own merits and for their 
appropriateness to be reconsidered, given collateral developments.
The single market and economy
The policy review process since Grand Anse and the West Indian Commission Report has 
been one of adapting CARICOM policy to make it more compatible with economic developments 
in the member States and globally. These liberalizing influences predated Grand Anse and the West 
Indian Commission, and may have prompted them, but they prevailed despite regional efforts to 
restrain them.
The regional model was the child of an earlier generation. Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s 
was geared to securing command and control of external and domestic activities and thereby, 
hopefully, the trajectory o f future economic endeavours. Crucial to this approach, in open Caribbean 
economies, were measures to control international economic linkages. Controls, on export earnings 
via bilateral trade agreements to cover prices and quantities. Controls, on payments via foreign 
exchange regulations and rationing, import licences and/or punitive tariffs. Controls, on capital 
movements and denial of foreign exchange to nationals via the foreign exchange regime. All controls 
were designed by the public sector to secure monopoly control over foreign exchange. Domestically, 
the public sector would rank activities in priority and encourage them by incentives. Markets were 
deemed to be imperfect or nonexistent though the policies espoused had the effect o f weakening and 
distorting them even more. The prevailing wisdom said that these policies were the most appropriate 
to achieve rapid self-reliant development.
CARICOM policy was an extension o f this national view but with the regional economy 
substituting for the domestic economy. The expansion was based on expediency, since the limits of 
the national economy under the prevailing model became quickly obvious. Yet this expedient fell 
between stools.
Supporters of the closed model were reluctant to open it to the region, hence licences, quotas 
and other trade impediments became hardy perennials within the market. Efforts to allocate industries 
between countries failed. Payments within the region were subject to the same impediments as to third
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countries and investment funds were hoarded by central banks for allocation by the public sector. 
Stratagems in CARICOM to get around these national reflexes went unused, or collapsed.
The flaws o f the prevailing development model surfaced first and most painfully in those 
countries implementing it most zealously. Symptoms were stagnation, disequilibrium, shortages and 
black markets for goods and currency. Markets for goods, services and foreign exchange were rigged 
and prices no longer reflected demand. Overriding all was a sense of arbitrariness, a destruction of 
confidence, a loss of enterprise and a hesitance among the brightest to enter productive activities. 
Such investments as were undertaken were focused to national or regional markets where they were 
guaranteed a free ride.
The seeds o f liberalization later grew most virulently where the prevailing model was 
discredited, giving rise to wild strategy swings and polarizing the policy debate. Regionally, just as 
the believers in the closed model were reluctant to open it to the region, so the proponents o f the 
open model were reluctant to limit it to the region. Accordingly, opening the national economy to the 
global market would make redundant any piecemeal initiatives for opening it to the regional market.
Table 2
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 
Selected indicators for 1994
Export<l> Merchandise Merchandise and Trade taxes/ Unemployment
Country Concentration (%) Trade/G.D.P. (%) N.F.S./G.D.P. (%) Tax revenue (%) Rates (%)
Anguilla 55.4 146.9 77.0
Antigua/Barbuda 75.8 152.6 66.1 5.7
Barbados 23.3 54.8 <2> 95.7 8.6 <6>21.2
Belize 34.1 79.2 128.0 54.4 9.8
Dominica 47.9 79.3 124.5 56.5 9.9
Dominican Republic<5> 25.3 32.9 62.7 44.8
Grenada 9.3 58.6 99.1 56.9 15.3
Jamaica <3>78.4 78.6 <2> 101.9 14.0 <6>15.4
Montserrat 41.5 <2> 77.3 52.5 5.5
St.Kitt s/Nevis 40.7 65.2 144.5 55.2 4.7
St. Lucia 49.3 69.3 113.9 58.7 7.2
St. Vincent 29.0 70.0 90.5 50.6 17.9
Suriname 57.4 77.1 92.8 41.7
Trinidad/Tobago <4>75.5 55.8 61.9 10.4 <6>18.5
Source: ECLAC, derived from national data 
<l>Major export as a percentage of merchandise exports 
<2>Refers to Goods and Tourism earnings only 
<3>Refers to Bauxite and Alumina.
<4>Refers to Petroleum and Petrochemicals .
: <5>Refers to 1993 
<6>Refers to 1994, remainder based on most recent data
While the single market and economy fell between stools ideologically, it was also difficult 
to defend on pragmatic grounds. Trade in goods and non-factor services constituted a significant part
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of Gross Domestic Product in most Caribbean countries (Table 2), Although it varied from country 
to country, it is estimated that aggregate trade was equal to the aggregate GDP for CARICOM 
countries as a group (Worrell, 1993). Given the limited coverage o f domestic consumption by local 
production, export performance determined the import capacity for capital, intermediate and final 
consumption goods and the level o f economic activity for each country.
CARICOM trade was not, however, a large part of overall trade, peaking at 14 per cent in 
1989. Furthermore, it was noted elsewhere that if tourism, petroleum and other resource based items 
were excluded, the portion which could be directly affected by internal liberalization policies would 
fall to about 4 per cent o f total goods and services (Worrell 1993). The prospects for a significant 
increase in regional trade were at best low, especially since the comprehensive support measures to 
favour regional trade were being progressively reduced.
Given these stark facts, the effort expended to consolidate and expand the single market was 
difficult to justify, especially since some of these measures worked against extraregional export 
expansion. High levels o f regional protection did manage to stimulate production for the domestic 
market, albeit so inefficiently that the transport costs to a neighbouring CARICOM member would 
often render it uncompetitive with local production or imports from third countries (Worrell, 1993). 
Such production also placed a high inefficiency tax on domestic consumers and encouraged activities 
which had scant chance of ever becoming competitive in third markets. High levels o f protection 
biased production away from export activities and as the protection was removed, many activities 
ceased to be viable, since they were inherently inappropriate for regional production.
Expanded economic relations
At the heart o f the strategy for widening lay a preoccupation with small size and the limited 
leverage which small countries were perceived to exert in international relations. The strategy to 
increase such leverage lay in a two-stage process. Firstly, to create a single CARICOM market and 
economy speaking with one voice. Secondly, members would deploy this voice through the ACS, 
using it as a lever to exert a greater influence on hemispheric and global relations than they could by 
just speaking as CARICOM alone.
The strategy might be flawed. A single market and economy were not essential for 
CARICOM to conduct joint foreign policy. However, the unified position envisaged was desirable 
and perhaps necessary to conduct the type of foreign economic policy envisaged by the Caribbean 
integration model. This foresaw a managed economy, with managed trade advancing through gradual 
and selective new initiatives tilted preferentially in favour o f CARICOM countries.
Several criticisms could be leveled at the strategy. The most significant was that it misjudged 
the context in which the policy was to be applied, since the model o f managed trade relations based 
on preferences was rapidly losing global acceptability. As global markets became more clearly 
defined, the tenets o f international trade theory seemed to gain in credibility, supplanting the closed 
model espoused by development economics.
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As markets consolidated and became more transparent even large countries lost their capacity 
to influence them. The desire to retain market power might explain efforts to create larger and larger 
economic blocs. In this context, a bloc of less than six million souls remained minuscule. The 
momentum developed by the successful Uruguay Round and the WTO gave a further fillip to the 
multilateral process and increased the prospect of a transparent multilateral trading system. This 
further reduced the disadvantage o f small firms. For as the market consolidated and became more 
transparent, small specialized segments of it became identifiable which weakened the advantage o f  
large mass production firms and favoured small flexible specialized producers. Moreover, the 
programme of the GATT closely approximated that proposed for the FTAA and the GATT timetable 
might be slightly ahead in several o f the provisions (ECLAC, December 1995).
The relative rates o f change in CARICOM vis a vis the rest o f the hemisphere seemed also 
to have been misjudged. Changes necessary within CARICOM, to control or benefit from hemispheric 
or global shifts, seemed to have come too slowly and seemed to have been rendered redundant by 
them. For example, hemispheric relations developed neck and neck with the ACS in the subregion, 
and both greatly surpassed the speed at which the CARICOM single market and economy were 
evolving internally. From the CARICOM viewpoint this was a perverse sequence, since the single 
market and economy were expected to build momentum, via the ACS, to the hemispheric FTAA. 
Caution is needed in this assessment, however, since the process is not yet complete. Nevertheless, 
the start was not auspicious.
The expectation of a tidy progression from the small CARICOM bloc, exerting leverage in 
a larger ACS bloc, seems to downplay the complex cross-cutting of blocs in Latin America. The ACS 
would include members of the CACM, NAFTA, the Group o f Three, the Andean Pact, and 
eventually, perhaps MERCOSUR. Presumably they would all have bloc and national interests o f their 
own too.
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RECONCILING REGIONAL POLICIES WITH GLOBAL TRENDS
CARICOM policy should be judged by its appropriateness to meet stated goals. This could 
be measured, inter alia, by its technical feasibility and internal consistency. Did the policy work, would 
it achieve the objective and was it internally consistent? Policy must be judged not only for internal 
consistency but also whether it was consistent with external policies impinging upon the group, in this 
case national policies and global policies. It might be argued that antagonisms between national and 
regional policies could not arise since regional policies were defined by national actors. The argument 
required two responses. Firstly, the capacity for internal policy coordination was still weak in the 
member countries. Ministries implementing the liberalization programmes were not always the same 
as those pursuing trade policy. The latter which constituted the Common Market forums were also 
greatly influenced by industries spawned by protection and still dependent upon it. Secondly, all 
countries were not at the same stage o f the liberalization process so that policy consensus was often 
difficult to obtain.
The national/regional paradigm stressed that external policy should be an outgrowth of 
national objectives. While logically sound it may have overestimated the regional capacity to influence 
external events and markets. Misjudgement on this issue could have severe repercussions for small 
open countries. For example, consistency between regional and global trade policy was essential 
simply because non-regional trade exceeded 90 per cent o f the total. Moreover, the acceptable rules 
of the game were being defined outside of the region, in the GATT. Yet regional policy was still seen 
by some as competing with extraregional policy. The goal of reconciling regional and global policies 
was further complicated since this consistency had to be maintained as the values and goals of 
national and global actors changed over time.
CARICOM goals were stated as follows: “Determined to consolidate and strengthen the 
bonds which have historically existed among their peoples; Sharing a common determination to fulfil 
the hopes and aspirations of their peoples for full employment and improved standards o f work and 
living; Conscious that these objectives can most rapidly be attained ... through the exercise of 
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources; by the efficient operation o f common services and 
functional cooperation in social, cultural, educational and technological fields; and, by a common 
front in relation to the external world; Convinced of the need to elaborate an effective regime by 
establishing and utilizing institutions designed to enhance the economic social and cultural 
development of their peoples” (Preamble to the Treaty of Chaguaramas). Accordingly they agreed 
to pursue economic integration, through the common market; coordination o f the foreign policies of 
member States; and functional cooperation.
Integration was to be seen as being a complex mixture o f ends and means. It was driven by 
feelings of ethnic, racial, linguistic and cultural affinity. It was also driven by feelings o f vulnerability 
and marginalization. These feelings were, paradoxically, thrown into stark relief because of 
expectations engendered by the prevailing ethos. This stressed nationalism, in the context o f a strong 
nation State, as the means to protect national interests from a hostile external environment. But
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integration was also expected to meet concerns about the quality o f domestic governance in very 
small States. These elements, taken together, were sufficiently strong for integration to be seen as an 
end. For example, the Commission stated that, “The objective of our work is the improvement o f the 
lives of all West Indians”. But it goes on to state immediately that, “Our conviction is that this can 
best be achieved through closer West Indian integration in every sphere o f activity”(Time for Action, 
P 29). Later the report stated that this was also the view o f the people it consulted who expressed 
the view that it, “should result in a better life for themselves and, very importantly, the prospect for 
a better life and improved opportunities for their children. They believe that these ends can be 
advancedmost effectively through accelerated CARICOM integration and closer co-operation with 
sister Caribbean countries”(Time for Action, P 33). Nevertheless, integration, through the Common 
Market, was also seen as a means to improve material well-being.
Given that integration was a fundamental part o f the regional philosophy and satisfied several 
valuable social and psychic needs, it must be redefined to reconcile it with global trends. Failure to 
do so might hamper economic development and fail to satisfy a major objective o f CARICOM people, 
full employment and improved standards of work and living. In turn, this might lead to a rejection of 
its positive elements, a reduced sense of identity and morale for Caribbean people and a passive 
incorporation into the wider global community. This mode of integration into the global community 
is regarded by some as absorption.
The concept o f open regionalism, espoused by ECLAC might provide some pointers. Open 
regionalism was an attempt to reconcile, “the interdependence that stems from special, preferential 
agreements, and that which basically arises from the market signals that are produced by trade 
liberalization in general. What open regionalism seeks to accomplish is to make explicit integration 
policies compatible with, and complementary to, policies to enhance international competitiveness”15. 
(ECLAC 1994)
The discussion about open regionalism was germane to CARICOM since it responded to 
many o f the conflicting currents which buffet Caribbean people. Policies toward greater economic 
liberalization were evident at the national level and these gave rise to fears for the survival o f regional 
initiatives. Grand Anse and the West Indian Commission which followed it, were attempts to 
reestablish the primacy of the regional model. The ongoing revision of policy since then has attempted 
to make regional strategies more compatible with national and global policies. This has taken the form 
o f a dialectic, however, since both currents were still deemed by many in the region to be 
antagonistic. Several of the proposals for open regionalism were in fact being adopted by CARICOM. 
Notable were the efforts to liberalize markets and implement measures to reduce transaction costs. 
Efforts to broaden the narrow focus from a goods market to one for services, capital and labour were 
also moves in the right direction. Several initiatives will continue to be o f benefit to member 
countries. Yet many of the strictly economic measures will evolve to a much broader hemispheric and 
ultimately global level with the passage o f time. Many wonder what would be left?
Several of the proposals considered to be consistent with open regionalism are set out at Annex A.
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As mentioned above, Caribbean integration springs not only from a desire to increase material 
wealth but includes a strong sense o f shared values. The concept o f single market and economy 
evolved to give form to its economic dimensions. But integration also has political and other 
dimensions, not universally accepted, or even precisely defined but, nevertheless, held by many. These 
include a sense o f closeness, o f cultural affinity and the belief that the disadvantages o f small size, 
which are primarily psychological, can be reduced by cooperation. Integration is also the quest to find 
institutions to make these diffuse sentiments concrete.
It has been suggested that “political union could be conceived o f in innovative ways that do 
not necessitate the amalgamation of power into one single centre or even federalism” but through “a 
dynamic and divisible concept o f statehood, sovereignty and nationality constituted in, say, a West 
Indian Commonwealth or West Indian citizenship” ... “West Indian unity would be anchored and 
expressed through political forces as cultural-historical identity, kinship, security and defined rights 
rather than through regional integration schemes...” (Brewster 1993). This formulation seemed to 
capture deep felt sentiments in a way which did not force it to contend with nationalism or the vain 
quest for a powerful nation-State. It might be useful to explore forms which would make the idea 
concrete since it appears to be compatible with post modern thinking.
CARICOM is unique in the Latin American context because o f the priority which it gives to 
functional cooperation, policy coordination, improved governance and inclusive culture. These areas 
are far less controversial, they have suffered far fewer policy reversals, they have achieved much 
greater consensus and higher rates o f implementation than the faltering efforts to achieve the single 
market and economy and they will probably outlast it. Moreover, they are consistent with 
international trends to greater cooperation between States.
The initiatives coming from within CARICOM, from the hemisphere at large, through the 
FTAA, and from the expectation that hemispheric arrangements must be replicated to the traditional 
trading partners in Europe and beyond, all place the notion of a unique CARICOM single market and 
economy under stress. Serious questions therefore arise as to: the ways in which CARICOM will 
need to adjust its economic arrangements; whether CARICOM countries can qualify as a group for 
entry to the FTAA and, if not, what are the implications o f individual entry for CARICOM; the state 
of relations with the EU, including the current preferential arrangements; the role o f the ACS given 
the current impetus to the FTAA; whether the FTAA is the most appropriate means o f integrating 
into the global economy; and last, but by no means least, whether the FTAA will materialize and if 
not, what fall back exists for Caribbean countries.
CARICOM, despite its move to strengthen the single market is unlikely to be able to retain 
its present market arrangements. The single market is still very small to develop the scale economies 
necessary for global penetration. The policies of high protection under which it is predicated are 
under pressure regionally and globally. They are also under pressure from the domestic policies of 
some ofits members, which are premised on the liberalization of markets and increasing mobility of 
productive factors. The CET is under pressure from within the group and from without, via the 
GATT and from the FTAA. Policy convergence is necessary for a functioning common market, yet
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will be difficult to achieve as all are small fragile economies, requiring nimble economic management. 
All economies are not changing with the same tempo and consensus on the choice of appropriate 
policy tools is still limited. Moreover, they are small high cost producers. The poteptial for integrating 
investment and production within the common market, though probably limited, has also been slow 
to materialize. Production will, therefore, tend toward specialized high income elastic products, for 
which there is minimal demand within the common market, but for which relatively large markets can 
be found globally. Caribbean producers have traditionally focused on such markets in recognition 
o f the fact that the capacity to import, even from within the common market, depends on their export 
capability to the rest o f the world.
While most elements of the single market and economy seem to rest on dubious premises, 
CARICOM encompasses far more than its market arrangements. Functional cooperation in its various 
guises and the coordination and exchange of ideas on foreign and domestic policies will remain viable 
and:valued activities. Ways need also to be found to build the political elements mentioned earlier into 
a new constellation of regional activities, since the non-economic needs o f CARICOM will become 
even more acute as the member countries find their way globally.
Positions taken toward market liberalization were not unanimous within CARICOM and the 
pace o f domestic economic preparation amongst members to participate in wider markets was 
uneven16. Enthusiasm for liberalization seemed less strong for those countries which eschewed 
exchange rate policy flexibility, since while relinquishing flexibility on exchange rates they needed to 
be more concerned with external balance. Accordingly, they are more cautious about liberalized trade 
and capital flows and about embracing wider markets. Commitment to market liberalization and the 
state o f preparedness seemed best to coincide in Trinidad and Tobago, with Guyana being somewhat 
less committed though better prepared than many, although debt obligations weakened its case. In 
Jamaica, the converse was true, with strong commitment, although the level o f economic performance 
was somewhat weaker, judged by high inflation and steady depreciation o f the currency. Both factors 
were caused, in part, by onerous debt obligations. These countries may be referred to somewhat 
euphemistically as the “leaders” in liberalization.
Barbados seems well prepared though, perhaps, somewhat less committed to liberalization. 
This was in part because its current economic stability was reached in the context o f greater 
administrative controls, which will need to be relaxed in a liberalized framework. The OECS countries 
and Belize were relatively less prepared, with the former seemingly less committed than the latter. 
Most OECS countries achieved stability spanning several years, like Barbados, with effectively used 
controls, including fixed exchange rates. However, these countries were still quite dependent on 
import taxes for revenues and their major export crop, bananas, remained subsidized. Belize was in 
the process o f policy reform and was currently experiencing some instability in its fiscal account,
The completeness o f preparation includes the adoption o f policy tools which will accurately reflect and 
adjust to domestic and global market signals. Openness to trade in goods and services and relatively free movement o f capital 
for at least cuirent transactions are further prerequisites, as is legislation to protect intellectual property. It is demonstrated 
by a measure o f domestic economic stability, judged, inter alia, by price and exchange rate indicators, under this regime.
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although export performance remained strong. It must still face the impending shock from the 
removal o f subsidies on bananas, although in this regard it is less vulnerable than several other 
Caribbean countries. Several areas o f policy reform remain to be tackled, especially measures to 
reduce the dependence on trade taxes. Suriname, a recent entrant to CARICOM, is currently mired 
in domestic policy adjustment o f a magnitude not experienced in other CARICOM countries. 
Currently, it can ill-afford to focus on international economic policy. This latter group may be 
considered to be “lagging” in their policies toward liberalization.
The state o f preparedness among CARICOM members is, therefore, uneven although it is 
conceivable that the lagging countries could meet the criteria o f sufficient openness to qualify for 
entry to the FTAA by 2005, if they wish to do so and if in fact the FTAA comes into force at that 
time. A decision of only some CARICOM countries to enter the FTAA could create strains, especially 
if the lagging countries sought to freeze or retard the preparations o f CARICOM membership as a 
whole. This would create internal tensions before the deadline for accession, since the lagging 
countries would immediately begin to reduce the rate of policy reform of the “leaders” in areas which 
would require consensus by all CARICOM members, such as trade policy. It is difficult to predict 
how the internal dynamic within CARICOM would evolve, although if the past provides a guide, 
members would in all likelihood act unilaterally, without central sanctions being applied. Members 
might, therefore, go their separate ways leaving a small group of lagging countries for the eventual 
common market core. This could weaken the grouping and endanger those aspects o f the community 
most likely to be useful for the future.
CARICOM retains a dependent relationship with the EU. It has been slow to take advantage 
of opportunities to build stronger economic linkages with that grouping through investment and joint 
enterprises, although the option was proffered through the various Lome proposals. The focus 
remained on preferential arrangements for traditional exports to Europe and aid flows. The former 
arrangements have a finite life, being under threat from the GATT and bilaterally from the United 
States and within the region. Aid flows are likely to taper off in all scenarios. Policy attention in the 
EU  is focusing on the integration of its immediate neighbours in Eastern Europe, building stable 
relationships with the southern Mediterranean and assisting the development o f sub-Saharan Africa. 
Further afield, new impetus is being given to the trans Atlantic dialogue. Despite the existence of 
strong pockets o f protectionist influences in some EU countries, as indeed they are strong in some 
sectors in the United States, a free-trade arrangement of broad scope between the EU and the United 
States/NAFTA is not inconceivable by the year 2000. Momentum is also building quickly in the 
EU/MERCOSUR relationship.
While the CARICOM/EU relationship is strong, its importance must be placed in proper 
perspective. Already, the Hispanic influences in the EU have widened its focus, to include the Spanish 
speaking Caribbean countries. EU interest in Central America is also strong. Given the commitment 
of EU countries to the concept of integration, it is not surprising that Caribbean integration is strongly 
supported. Yet it would not be inconsistent if the EU found it administratively more convenient in 
the future to treat with the ACS countries as a group. It is highly unlikely that the current Lome 
policies vis-à-vis preferences and financial assistance will continue with the CARICOM countries or
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be extended to the wider group. These developments argue for a more mature relationship with the 
EU, based on mutual interest. The objective should be to better integrate Caribbean economies into 
that o f the EU, so as to identify areas of mutual benefit. The Caribbean might provide productive 
workers for the creation o f goods and services, allocational benefits for EU industries and services 
and markets in the Caribbean. They would, in turn, receive investments, technology and access to 
markets in Europe. In effect, efforts should be made to establish a comprehensive range o f economic 
arrangements similar to those envisaged for the FTAA. The current Lome arrangements still have 
some time to run. Nevertheless, it would be infinitely preferable for new attitudes to the 
EU/CARJCOM relationship to begin now.
The ACS was proposed by the West Indian Commission to resolve the issue o f how to 
interact with adjacent countries, some of which had longstanding applications for CARICOM 
membership. The ACS was mooted before the hemispheric thrust gained momentum, at the time 
seeming to be as much as the current state of thinking within CARICOM membership would bear. 
Accordingly, it was not intended as a free trade arrangement. Since then much has happened to 
increase the range of options available to CARICOM leaders. For some o f them, the larger and more 
sophisticated markets in North America for goods, capital and technology hold a strong attraction. 
For the countries which lag in the adjustment process it exposes them to almost the same risks o f 
market penetration as would occur with the wider FTAA, but with the possible disadvantage o f lower 
quality higher priced products, reduced access to the larger pool o f capital and technology and the 
larger and more diversified market of North America.
It is sometimes argued that the ACS could provide a way station to the FTAA. This will only 
be possible if the process of transformation within the ACS is so efficiently and expeditiously 
managed as to provide a liberalizing momentum to cascade into the FTAA. The chances o f using the 
spur o f the FTAA to persuade the laggers seem to be better within the familiar confines of 
CARICOM than in the newer and more heterogenous ACS. For the leaders, the ACS could provide 
a test ground for market opening but the timing is unlikely to be sufficiently generous for that benefit 
to be realized. The original intention, o f preferential bloc type negotiations, seems to have been 
overtaken by events.
Integration into the FTAA market, like integration into any limited market, will always be seen 
as technically second best to integration into the global market. But given the state o f thinking in the 
region, it might be easier to sell the benefits of a binding hemispheric arrangement, with reciprocal 
rights and duties and a clearly defined ‘‘club”, than the more diffuse and difficult to grasp concept 
of integration into the global economy. The latter might represent too large a qualitative change to 
be readily embraced while conceptually, the FTAA could be explained as part o f a process of 
measured steps, from CARICOM to the ACS to the FTAA. Impetus to action might also be propelled 
by the fears of being left out or behind, or by envy that a neighbour could gain a benefit to which one 
would be denied.
Managing the process of policy transformation to qualify for entry to the FTAA. would also 
be more effective, with timetables, deadlines and discreet policy steps to qualify for entry.
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Fortunately, given the current outward looking nature o f the mooted agreement and its size, the 
criteria for qualification to the FTAA should not differ significantly from that which would fit its 
members to benefit from more outward trade policies. If the process o f accession to the FTAA can, 
therefore, set in train an outward orientation in the attitudes of CARICOM countries, the policies 
should improve their prospects for more efficient global interaction. But lurking in the background 
is always the danger that trade blocs could change from being stepping stones to stumbling blocks 
in the way of global integration. Economic conflict between three large blocs might benefit a few in 
the short run, but probably not the smallest countries.
The establishment of the FTAA by 2005 was not a certainty. The forces o f protection and 
inward orientation existed in the prime driver o f the FTAA, as they existed elsewhere. These forces 
cut across political boundaries, so that judging the probability of achieving the FTAA by 2005 was 
clouded in some uncertainty. Opinions could shift rapidly in response to global or domestic political 
events. Attitudes to the FTAA could also be influenced by the position of a leading country in its 
economic cycle, whether the economy was expanding and confidence high or whether it was in 
recession with high unemployment. A decision might be swayed by a favourable or unfavorable 
conjuncture o f events. These considerations raised the spectre o f uncertainty or even caprice. They 
also raised the question o f what CARICOM countries should do in the event that the FTAA did not 
materialize?
It was suggested above that integration into the global economy was the best option for 
CARICOM countries, but that managing the process might be difficult and subject to considerable 
slippage if undertaken as a CARICOM group, or even unilaterally. The failure o f the FTAA need not, 
therefore, be a source of dread, provided countries meet the criteria for membership. This is because 
the process would have led CARICOM countries most of the way to meeting the criteria for global 
integration. As it proceeded to qualify for the FTAA, CARICOM countries should, therefore, 
continue to develop their relations with traditional trading partners in the EU and continue to 
strengthen their relations with selected Asian countries. These partners should be made aware from 
the outset, that Most Favoured Nation treatment would be willingly and expeditiously extended to 
them. Every effort should be made to encourage investment and trade from these groups, initially in 
the event of a FTAA but also for non-hemispheric markets, with or without it.
In conclusion, preparations for hemispheric interaction should be seen as part o f a process, 
a process which should erect a framework to help Caribbean countries to move from protected 
inward looking arrangements to a system which will improve their chances in dynamic global markets, 
whether they are located in the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, Asia or elsewhere. 
Simultaneously, as the single market withered away CARICOM countries should try to reap any 
benefits they could from increased factor mobility in the region to build productive enterprises. 
Finally, the non-economic aspects o f CARICOM should be bolstered and ways explored to nurture 





The following pointers were suggested by ECLAC (ECLAC 1994), to guide regional 
initiatives which wanted to adapt an open integration policy:
* Policy should provide for an extensive liberalization o f markets in terms of sectors. This 
implies few exceptions though it does not preclude differing transition periods. Given the benefits 
already derived from unilateral liberalization on intraregional trade, tariff and non-tariff barriers 
should not be increased.
* A broad liberalization o f markets, in terms of countries, is also needed. This implies first, 
making the criteria for new members to join more flexible; second, harmonizing standards on the basis 
o f those established at the multilateral level; and third, according investment o f intraregional origin 
the same treatment as national investment.
* The integration process should be governed by stable, transparent rules.
* As stabilization is consolidated, it will be possible to reach more ambitious integration
agreements; in other words, to multilateralize the process.
* In the current international context, common external tariffs and moderate levels o f protection 
against third-party competitors are efficient instruments for reducing incentives for smuggling and 
avoiding accusations of unfair trade practices. It should be borne in mind that rules o f origin could 
become a hidden instrument o f protectionism. While these rules may be necessary, especially in the 
absence of common tariffs, considerations of competitiveness and equity imply that their requirements 
should be limited.
* National treatment should be extended to intraregional investment.
* Integration can also help to cut down on factors that make transactions more difficult or
costly, which in addition to tariff and non-tariff trade barriers increase costs to regional suppliers and 
effectively obstruct reciprocal trade. This might involve building infrastructure to link countries 
together, eliminating or harmonizing rules and regulations and implementing institutional reforms to 
make it easier for incomplete or fragmented markets to become integrated.
* Where trade imbalances exist among the countries of the region, it is better to deal with them 
on the basis of negotiations or prior consultations rather than to try correcting macroeconomic 
asymmetries exclusively by cutting back on reciprocal trade.
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* Since intraregional trade is vulnerable to temporary global deficits in the balance o f payments 
(and their potential impact on exchange rates), regional institutions that work to shore up the balance 
of payments might need to be legally and financially strengthened.
* Payment systems could also become a basic tool for facilitating the expansion o f reciprocal 
trade and investment flows.
* The harmonization of standards must be made a basic component o f the integration process.
* An integration process intended to promote the absorption of technological progress requires, 
in addition to the extensive liberalization of markets, flexible sectoral arrangements to help enterprises 
reap the potential benefits o f integration.
* The sectoral arrangements established under integration agreements should be reoriented so 
that they are no longer confined to trade regulation. They should become more flexible and open- 
ended, for purposes such as eliminating obstacles through projects or facilitating trade and 
investment.
* These commitments would thus become forums for cooperation between the public and 
private sectors and could be designed to fulfil some o f the systemic requirements o f competitiveness 
in the participating countries.
* In order to foster interdependence, the absorption of technologies should be expedited at the 
regional level by various means, such as greater mobility of skilled labour, reciprocal investment, joint 
use o f infrastructure, production of inputs that can be used in a number o f different industries, 
adoption of new technological systems, exchange of technological data, experience and opportunities.
* The process of technological dissemination and innovation which integration seeks to promote 
requires the strengthening of relations with countries outside the region where most major 
technological innovations originate.
* There is a need for mechanisms to make it easier for small and medium-sized enterprises, to 
obtain financing and technology.
* In general, the aim should be to promote actions that stimulate supply to meet the greater, 
more exacting demand created by broadened, liberalized markets.
* Finally, social integration within each country, through the enactment o f policies aimed at 
reducing marginalization, plays a crucial role in regional integration, not only by increasing the size 
o f the markets being integrated, but also by making a contribution to a more participatory, solid 
development of international competitiveness.
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* One way o f reconciling these viewpoints is to implement the tariff reduction processes, 
gradually and progressively to ease the adjustment of production activities to the new circumstances. 
Countries or sectors considered to be less able to take advantage o f the broadened market would 
make this adjustment through slower, but clearly established, tariff reduction processes.
* Special treatment that would generate benefits both for countries with less capacity to take 
advantage o f the potential o f integration and for the other countries.
* Trade integration may increase the need to coordinate macroeconomic policies. Moreover, 
it must be recalled that the most solid forms of coordination result from a somewhat lengthy process, 
during which integration gradually gathers momentum and macroeconomic policies constantly 
interact.
* Exchange of information and an examination o f the potential impacts o f the coordination of 
exchange-rate policy, in a narrow context, is not a practical option at the current early stage of Latin 
American and Caribbean integration processes.
* The institutions in charge of implementing economic integration processes must reflect the 
degree of advancement of those processes.
* It would be advisable to avoid rigid commitments in favour o f flexible schemes that are 
adaptable enough to ensure that the pace of institutional development is determined by the momentum 
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